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CRITIQUE OF THE FELLOWS-KIMBROUGH RULE
LESLIE H. VOGEL AND ROBERT K. LOCK
CIENTISTS

from varied fields are often called upon to enlighten

lay jurors with respect to the particular branch of scicnce involved. The Illinois Supreme Court has had frequent occasion
to consider the competency of the testimony of expert witnesses. The
court generally held that chemists,1 engineers, 2 and fingerprint experts3 might give direct evidence regarding their findings or opinions
in relation to an issue of causal -connection. However, in 1918, the
scope of expert testimony was limited. In that year, the case of
Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry. 4 announced the rule:
[W]hether or not a given condition or malady of a person may or could result
from and be caused by the facts stated in the hypothetical question, [was a
proper question for an expert witness] but [expert witnesses] should not be
asked whether or not such facts did cause and bring about such condition or
malady. 5

What prompted the court to announce a rule of such obviously
limited scope? It is a matter of conjecture whether the limitation direcdy resulted from judicial recognition of the growth of a coterie of
doctors who, recognizing a lucrative field, practiced medicine as was
stated by the astute advocate, Max Stener, "with their rights hands in
the air." Yet, that such condition in the courts had its effect upon
judicial thinking is evidenced by the decision in Opp v. Prior."There
it was said:
Expert testimony on matters not within common knowledge and experience
is necessary to enable juries to determine questions of fact sul)mitted to them,
and there are experts of great knowledge and high personal standing whose
opinions delivered without bias are a substantial aid to the attainment of jIus1 Koshinski v. Illinois Steel Co., 231 Ill. 198,83 N.E. 149 (1904).
2 McCabe v. Swift & Co., 143 Ill. App. 404 (1908).
s Mahlstedt v. Ideal Lighting Co., 271 Il. 154, 110 N.E. 795 (1915).

4 272 Il1. 71, 111 N.E. 499 (1916).
5 Ibid., at 77 (emphasis supplied).
6 294 Il. 538, 128 N.E. 580 (1920).
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tice. That class of evidence, however, is generally discredited . . . with good
the hired partisan and his opinion is a rereason, because the expert is often
7

sponse to a pecuniary stimulus .

This contention has been borne out sufficiently in that today it is
common knowledge that the use of medical experts has in recent years
reached a point where a specialized and small group of doctors do
little more than furnish evidence for those who employ them. This
condition of affairs. was recognized in the recent case of Keneny V.
Skorch8 where the court through Mr. Justice Schwartz criticized the
present use of partisan medical witnesses, saying:
He is part of the trial apparatus.of a personal injury case. As such, every
possible step should be taken to channel his contributions in a direction that
will serve the ends of justice. One sich step is to make his reports as nonpartisan. objective and scientific as are the other notable activities of his profcssion.9

The physician occupies an exalted position in society when his
efforts are directed to the healing of sickness and injury. The integrity
of his diagnoses made during his active practice is not often disputed.
In the treatment of a patient the doctor will determine within the
limits of medical certainty, the cause of the malady or, if uncertain,
will so state and propose further diagnostic procedures. Inasmuch as
7 Ibid., at 545, 583, where the court stated further: "The opinion has the sanction of
an oath but lacks the substantial safeguard of truth applied to testimony concerning
facts observed by a witness which is afforded by the criminal law since the opinion is
the result of reasoning, and no one can be prosecuted for defective mental processes.
The field of medicine is not an exact science, and the expert being immune from penaltics for perjury, his opinion is too often the natural and expected result of his employment. The objections to that character of evidence can only be overcome or obviated
b control by the court of the witness and the examination and such supervision as
\%'ill at least fairly present the facts upon which an opinion is called for. If the facts are
disputed the party examining the witness may include in the hypothesis only those
facts which the evidence on his side tends to prove, and it will be for the jury to say
whether the facts stated have been proved or not and accept or reject the opinion
accordingly. If the evidence as to the particular matter inquired about is not disputed
it is obvious that the hypothetical question must contain all the facts or the opinion will
not only be worthlcss but be likely to mislead the jury. If counsel selects from the undisputed facts those which are most favorable to his party and obtains an opinion
thereon, the jury may forget the partial nature of the premises and adopt the opinion
of the witness on the partial statement."
8 22 111. App.2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (1959).
•)Ibid., at 171, 493. While the courts regularly recognized the unreliability of such
testimony, a diligent search discloses very few reversals of exorbitant verdicts produced by the very evidence condemned. An inference to be drawn from the opinion
is that a'scgment of the medical profession should be selected as "nonpartisan" experts
subject to the call of the court or any litigant. Such a procedure is now in the experimental stage in New York. Whether this procedure will meet the complaints directed
at the present practice is problematical.
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the trial of a cause has for its object the discovery of the truth with
as much certainty as possible,"0 it is difficult to understand why the
doctor as a witness should not be confined to the same certainty in
his evidence, or required to state that he is without an opinion regarding the cause of the pathological conditions involved. Moreover, it is
believed that a rule of evidence requiring positive testimony would
have a salutary effect upon the medical witness and in some cases
make him pause before expressing an untenable or inaccurate opinion.
But such is not the case in Illinois. The medical witness is limited
strictly to could or might types of answers to hypothetical questions
rather than direct straightforward opinion testimony to be taken into
account by the jury as other opinion evidence.
In Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry., 11 a personal injury
action commenced as a result of a streetcar accident, the court was
asked to rule on the competency and admissibility of opinion testimony of medical experts. The railway company contended that the
collision was slight and resulted in no injuries, while the plaintiff contended that the impact was great, resulting in broken bones, nervousness and most important, a tumor and traumatic neurasthenia in the
area of the breast. At the first trial, judgment was entered for plaintiff
but was reversed on other grounds. In the second trial the defendant
questioned a medical expert regarding his testimony at the first trial
where he had stated that the plaintiff had cancer. The questioning in
the second trial brought out the fact that the doctor had been mistaken as to the cancer. The doctor further stated that the lump may
lie dormant and cause cancer years later. This was excepted to because
of its speculative nature, but the objection was overruled. On appeal,
the court clearly labeled this testimony speculative and incompetent.
The plaintiff then asked another medical expert witness:
Q. Doctor, referring to the suppositious or hypothetical patient and taking
into account the elements of the hypothesis, have you an opinion as a medical
man, and based upon reasonable certainty, as to what was the cause of the
neurasthenia and the tumor in the hypothetical patient?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is your opinion as to the connection between this disease and the
tumor or growth in the breast?
A. That the tumor resulted from the bruise-the injury to the breast. The
neurasthenia resulted from the shock of the accident, and was kept alive by
12
the breast condition.
10 Een v. Consolidated Freightways, 120 F. Supp. 289 (D. N.D., 1954).
11 272 111.7 1, 111 N.E. 499 (1915).

12 Ibid., at 76, 502.
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The trial court overruled defendant's objections to this testimony
but the supreme court reversed, holding this to be error and inadmissible as testimony invading the province of the jury. Further, the
court explained that the question of causal connection between the
accident and the final malady. was an ultimate fact upon which no
witness might express a direct opinion. It is 'contended that the rule
announced in the Kimbrough case calls for testimony which is speculative and conjectural. Thus,, the courts and trial bar of Illinois found
themselves on the horns of a dilemma. Quite certainly, it is soundlaw
that. on ultimate facts, witnesses may not be permitted: to invade the
province.of the jury either by direct lay testimony or by expert opinion. On the other hand, a well established and universally accepted
rule of evidence precludes speculative and-conjectural proof.
Further, in the Kimbrough opinion the court seems, to be inconsistent. The court, relying :on Chicago v. Didier8 and Schlauder
v. Southern Traction Company 4 stated that where there is no dispute asto the cause of the accident, and the fact was that some injury
resulted, direct evidence of a causal connection would be permitted.
It is difficult to reconcile this subsidiary holding with the main decision. In a case of disputed liability, if direct evidence of causal
connection is improper (even through the use of hypothetical questions), why should the same character of evidence be permitted in a
case in which only the issue of the extent of injury is involved?
Since the Kimlnough case allows only expert testimony of what
might or could be the cause, it requires no extensive mental gymnastics to point out that a doctor's hypothetical opinion that a given
state of facts might or could have resulted in the alleged disability is
pure and unadulterated speculation. In many cases where the cause
of the injury is not in issue, the condition of the plaintiff is established
by opinion evidence and yet, other occurrences or condition of illbeing, apparent or subsequently proved in the record, might or could
have resulted in the disability for which suit is brought. The mere
statement of this proposition is sufficient to indicate the speculative
character of the evidence.
A review of the prior decisions of the Illinois courts establishes that
the decision in the Fellows-Kimbroughcase is of ambiguous parentage.
Prior to 1904 the courts of Illinois held that a treating physician could
I'

227 I11.571, 81 N.E. 698 (1907).

14 253 111.159,97 N.E. 233 (1911).
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testify that the condition of his patient was directly due to the original
injury.' 5 It was not until 1904 that the evidentiary rule regarding
causal connection was attacked and then the issue arose as the result
of expert opinion evidence of alleged causation. In Illinois Central
R.R. Co. v. Smith, 6 it was held for the first time, that where the
evidence was in dispute as to the cause of the plaintiff's injury it was
improper for a medical expert witness to state that the injury was
caused by a particular condition. Thereafter, a number of exceptions
were engrafted upon this general rule in cases involving a dispute as
to the nature and extent of the injuries allegedly suffered by a plaintiff.
In Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Roberts17 medical experts testified
hypothetically on each side. Plaintiff's witness testified that plaintiff's
condition was undoubtedly due to the injuries he received. On review
the court said: "It is entirely immaterial whether the witness testified
that the injury was the cause of the condition, or that the injury was

sufficient to cause the condition or might have caused

it.

'' 1 8

The court

also commented that "the question" did not concern the cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. It was in regard to the relation between the hypothetically assumed injury and his condition as observed by the witness.
Thus, the court appears to have said that a hypothetical question concerning the cause of a claimed injury is not an excuse for a medical
expert to invade the jury's province, but rather concerns itself with
the question of what nexus, if any, exists as to the injury claimed and
the condition observed. The importance of this case is that despite
the court's language in arguendo and without regard to the claimed
invasion of the province of the jury by the question, the judgment in
favor of the plaintiff was affirmed. To like effect is the decision of
Fuhry v. Chicago City Ry. Co.' 9 There it was held that it was immaterial whether a medical expert testified that the alleged condition
of plaintiff was due to the injury that she had received or that he
testified that the injury might or could cause the condition. In deciding the case the court said:
15 Netcher v. Bernstein, 110 Ill. App. 484 (1903); Decatur v. Fisher, 63 11. 241 (1872).
Quite obviously, up to this point, the use of the expert for hypothetical purposes had
not come into use.
16 208 Ill. 608, 70 N.E. 628 (1904).
"7 229111. 481, 82 N.E. 401 (1907).
1s Ibid., at 484, 402.
19

239

Ill.

548, 88

N.E. 221 (1909).
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In any event the testimony was merely the opinion of the witness based upon

the facts he had testified to. It was still for the jury to determine the truth in
regard to those assumed facts, as well as any others which might tend to con20

firm or modify their reliance upon the opinion given.

It seemed that Illinois had completely departed from the ruling in
Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Smith, 2' but in 1913 in Lyons v.Chicago
City Ry. Co.2 and People v. Shultz, 2 3 exclusions of medical expert
testimony on causation lead one to question whether the Roberts case
and its liberal holding had been forgotten. At this point the Kimbrough rule appeared.
Wigmore in his treatise on Evidence 24 points out that the basis for
the Kimbrough ruling may have been a misquotation of Chicago v.
Didier.25 In quoting the Didier case, the court in Kimbrough allowed
positive expert testimony only when there is no dispute as to the
cause; but the correct statement, and one of significant distinction,
allowed testimony of a positive nature "where there is no dispute as
to the manner of the injury." 2
Illinois followed the rule in Kimbrough until 1922,27 when a modification appeared. In allowing the testimony whether a hernia was
caused by an injury to the abdomen, the court said the answer "did
not in any way specify whether the hernia was caused by this accident
or by some other injury. '28 This is hairsplitting. Nevertheless, this
interpretation of the Kimbrough ruling was followed down to 193 1.29
In that year, Sanitary District v. Industrial Commission"° brought the
20 Ibid., at 552,223.

-21208 Il.608, 70 N.E. 628 (1904), which sanctioned the use of "might have or could
have" type expert opinion.
22258 11. 75, 101 N.E. 211 (1913).
23 260111.35, 102 N.E. 1045 (1913).
24 7 XVigmore on Evidence, S 1976 (3rd ed., 1940).
25 227 Ill. 571, 81 NE. 698 (1907).
26 Ibid., at 575, 700.
27 Davis v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 294 Ill.
355, 128 N.E. 539 (1920); International
Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm., 293 Ill.
524, 127 N.E. 703 (1920); Hanrahan v.
Chicago, 289 111.
400, 124 N.E. 547 (1919); Heineke v. Chicago R. Co., 279 Il. 210, 116
N.E. 761 (1917).
2S Walsh v. Chicago R. Co., 303 Ill.
339, 344, 135 N.E. 709, 712 (1922).
-9 People v. Rongetti, 338 Ill.
56, 170 N.E. 14 (1929); People v. Zwienczak, 338 Ill.
237,
170 N.E. 303 (1930); People v. Vinn, 324 111.428, 155 N.E. 337 (1927); People v.
Carrico, 310 Ill.
543, 142 N.E. 164 (1923).
30 343 Ill.
236, 175 N.E. 372 (1931).
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rationale behind the Kimbrough ruling to its most stratospheric
heights. The court said that testimony by a medical expert that there
might or could be a causal connection was insufficient and that "liability cannot rest upon imagination, speculation or conjecture, but
must be based upon facts .... ,,31 Wigmore in commenting on this
case states:
[Alfter 30 years of allowing "what might have caused" (Illinois C.R. Co. v.
Smith, 208 Ii. 608) this is declared inadequate, and for 15 years past "what did
cause" has been forbidden (Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago R. Co., 272 I11.71);
thus all testimony to causation is choked off; the judicial vagaries on this topic
leave the practitioner in a parlous state. .....2

Fortunately, this state of affairs did not remain in effect for long. In
1937, the Kimbrough rule was again adhered to in People v. Arendarczyk. 3 The rule has remained intact up to the present time. 4
To refocus the problem, the Kimbrough rule is that a medical expert, whether giving direct testimony or answering a hypothetical
question, may give an expert opinion on causal connection between
the malady or condition and the injury which allegedly caused it only
if his opinion is stated that the malady might or could have resulted
from the injury. He may not state that the injury did cause the condition. The rationale for the rule is that to allow the witness to testify
that the accident did cause the injury would be to decide an ultimate
fact in issue and thereby invade the province of the jury whose function is to decide all factual issues.
Balanced against this invasion of the jury function is the problem
of speculative testimony. There are eight jurisdictions which seem to
follow evidentiary rules similar to the Kimbrough rule.3 With some
authorities vociferously denouncing the rule,30 it is logical that the
31 Ibid., at 242, 374.
32

7 Wigmore on Evidence,

1976, n. (3rd ed., 1940).

23367 Ill. 534, 12 N.E.2d 2 (1937); People v. Ardelean, 368 Ill. 274, 13 N.E.2d 976
(1938).
34 Williams v. Walsh, 341 I11.App. 543, 95 N.E.2d 743 (1951); People v. Shelton, 388
111.56, 57 N.E.2d 473 (1944).
35 Howland v. Cates, 43 So.2d 848 (Fla., 1949); Dedman v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.,
57 Idaho 160, 63 P.2d 667 (1936); Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry., 272 I1.71,
111 N.E. 499 (1916); Beneks v. State, 208 Ind. 317, 196 N.E. 73 (1935); State v. Winstead,
204 La. 366, 15 So.2d 793 (1943); Newton v. Gretter, 60 N.D. 635, 236 N.W. 254
(1931); Friese v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 324 Mass. 623, 88 N.E.2d 1 (1949); Cole v.
Simpson, 299 Mich. 589, 1 N.W.2d 2 (1941).
30 7 WVigmore on Evidence, § 1976 (3rd ed., 1940).
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majority of jurisdictions have more 'liberal rules concerning expert
opinion on the question of causal connection in injuries. The Supreme
Court of Missouri had occasion to consider the Missouri equivalent of
the rule in O'Leary v. Scullin Steel, Co."7 The conclusion reached in
that case was that the rule should, no longer be followed. The court
pointed out the specious reasoning that if the expert were to directly
state what the cause of the condition was, he would be outside the
area of his expertness and his testimony would be incompetent because
he would'no longer be acting as an expert. However, when an expert
is allowed to state, by virtue of a hypothetical question, what migbt
or could cause the condition, the jury is left with no evidence at all
on which to base their verdict.
The only evidence which, to the lay mind in the jury box, could be said to
havc any efficacy to point to one' rather than the other as to the cause of the
infection, is that of experts. In this situation, our law steps in and . . . directly

forbids the expert to say more than that the wound or the boil, or both, "might
or could" cause the infection of the bone. The jury is then in this situation:
Ithas before itno evidence on which itcan form an independent opinion as

to the cause; ithas expert testimony that the injury to the thumb "might or
could" cause-the bone infection; ithas before itother expert testimony that

the boil "migbt or could" cause it;
ithas, in this case, other testimony that

many other things "might or could" cause it;it has no testimony that either
the fvound or boil, or anything else, did cause it.38

The jury could then decide that the plaintiff who has the burden
of preponderating has failed to do so since the jury has no testimony
or other evidence to establish the causal relationship, but only that
something might or could have caused the condition. A very astute
observation made in O'Leary was that if the reason for the rule was
to prevent the invasion of the jury function, "then every opinion in
every case is incompetent for that reason or it is immaterial. ' 3 9 The
Missouri court believed that a reasonable invasion of the jury's province, left to the trial court's discretion, would be necessary to adequately inform the triers of fact. The basic reason for the rejection
of the Khnbrough rule in O'Leary was the desire to better inform the
jurors. Thirty-one other jurisdictions have also rejected the rule for
40
similar reasons.
Mo.363,260 S.W.55 (1924).
sIbid., at 375, 376, 59.
3 Ibid., at 376, 59.
40 Detroit T. I.R. v.Banning, 173 F.2d 752 (C.A.6th, 1949); Francis v.Southern
Pac. Ry., 162 F.2d 813 (C.C.A.10th, 1947); New York Life Ins. Co,v.Doerksen, 64 F.2d
37303

CRITIQUE OF THE FELLOWS-KIMBROUGH RULE

LI

Another vigorous vituperation against the Kimbrough rule is set
out in the opinion of Judge Schnackenberg of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Spears v. A. T. & Santa Fe
R.R.41 The strongest possible language was used in criticizing the
rule: "It is evident that the Kimbrough rule is unrealistic in its application and is based upon a strained theoretical premise. ' 42 It was
pointed out that the greatest weakness of the rule is that it invites the
jury to guess as to what is the cause. The opinion given, being specu-

lative and inconclusive, makes the testimony valueless as an aid to the
jury which is, after all, the sole reason for its admission.
Not only does the restraint imposed by the Kimbrough rule prevent "an
invasion of the province of the jury"; it actually leaves the jury floundering in
uncertainty and renders it likely to find, or reject a finding, of causal relation43
ship upon grounds without basis in the evidence.

The Spears case sets out the so-called "Federal Rule" that the opinion
of experts as to causation as well as the reasons upon which the opinion is founded should be submitted to the jury and they will be
240 (C.C.A. 10th, 1933); Denver & R. C. R. Co. v. Roller, 100 Fed. 738 (C.C.A. 9th,
1900); Birmingham E. & B. R. Co. v. Williams, 190 Ala. 53, 66 So. 653 (1914); Everett
v. State, 213 Ark. 470, 210 S.W.2d 918 (1948); Bland v. R. Co. 65 Cal. 626, 4 Pac. 672
(1884); Colorado M. & I. Co. v. Rees, 21 Col. 435, 42 Pac. 42 (1895); Boland v. Vanderbilt, 140 Conn. 520, 102 A.2d 362 (1953); Beasley v. Burt, 201 Ga. 144, 39 S.E.2d 51
(1946); Grismore v. Consul. Prod., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942); Packer v. Fairmont Creamery, 158 Kan. 580, 149 P.2d 629 (1944); H. & S. Theatres v. Hampton, 300
Ky. 677, 190 S.W.2d 39; Baltimore City R.R. v. Tanner, 90 Md. 315,45 At. 188 (1900);
Veller v. Northwest Airlines, 239 Minn. 298,58 N.W.2d 739 (1953); O'Leary v. Scullin
Steel Co., 303 Mo. 363, 260 S.W.55 (1924); Kelley v. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 Pac.
326 (1919); Horst v. Lewis, 71 Neb. 365, 103 N.W. 460 (1905); Lynch v. Sprague, 95
N.H. 485, 66 A.2d 697 (1949); Castner v. Sliker, 33 N.J. 95 (1868); Jones v. Citizens
Bank, 58 N.M. 48, 265 P.2d 366 (1954); Marx v. Ontario B. H. & A. Co., 211 N.Y. 33,
105 N.E. 97 (1914); Ford v..Blythe Bros., 242 N.C. 347, 87 S.E.2d 879 (1955); Scarinzi
v. Farkas, 80 Ohio App. 409,75 N.E.2d 86 (1947); Cohenour v. Smart, 205 Okla. 668,
240 P.2d 91 (1951); Schweigal v. Solbeck, 191 Ore. 454, 230 P.2d 195 (1951); Menarde

v. Phila. Trans. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954); Barker v. Narragansett Racing
Assn., 65 R.I. 489, 17 A.2d 23 (1940); Windham v. Florence, 221 S.C. 350, 70 S.E.2d 553
(1952); National Life & A. Ins. Co. v. Follett, 168 Tenn. 647, 80 S.W.2d 92 (1935);
Ynsfran v. Burkhart, 247 S.W.2d 907 (Tex., 1952); Hooper v. Gen. Motors, 260 P.2d
549 (Utah, 1953); Baldwin v. Gaines, 92 Vt. 61, 102 Ad. 338 (1917); Hayzlett v. Westvaco Chlorine Prod., 125 W.Va. 611, 25 S.E.2d 759 (1943); Lyon v. Grand Rapids, 121
Wis. 609,99 N.W.311 (1904).
41

255 F.2d 780 (C.A.7th, 1958).

42

Ibid., at 783.

43 Ibid., at 782.
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allowed to decide the issue, keeping in mind that the testimony is
4
opinion and not a decision of fact binding upon them.1
-CONCLUSION'

We have, therefore, considered theprimary criticisms of the 'Kimbrough rule as illustrated by the.0'Leary and Spears cases. 4 5 Both the
federal and the'majority of thd state courts have indicated that: to limit
expert testimofih to speculative "could or might" opinions is to do
the jury more ha'mr than good. There is an evident trend in connection with expert opinion' testimony to allow greater latitude in the
ever increasing search for the truth.4 6 Wigmore believes that, eventually, the,.entire problem of the trial bar in connection with expert
opinion testimony -will disappear.47 The Fellows-Kimbrough rule is
not only antiquated and out of step with the majority; it is cumbersome, narrow and does not solve the:basic problem' confronting the
trier of facts-the search for truth-but rather materially hinders that
search. At the time of its inception, there may have been a justifiable
basis for the rule, but it has been lost in the. changing concept of fairness and the increasing latitude allowed in the presentation of evidence.
The rule does not even satisfy the main reason given for its inception,
i.e., prevention of' the invasion of the province of the jury; for an
expert opinion on causation, no matter how forcefully stated, is still
an opinion and may be met by contradictory opinion. The quest for
truth is more important than quibbling over fine distinctions in the
admissibility of expert opinion testimony.
The logical conclusion is that the Kimbrough rule should be abandoned in Illinois. A logical replacement would be something akin to
the "Federal Rule." The experts should be allowed to give their opinions on causation, when it is in issue, supported by the reasons which
support their opinions. The jury should be instructed that the expert
44 Judge Schnackenberg states: "[I]f the relevant facts are proved by evidence and
called to the attention of the experts who are then permitted to state their opinions as
to causation as well as the reasons therefor, the jury can intelligently decide between
the conflicting opinions on causation in the light of the evidence of those facts. The
jury's determination of which opinion is right is clearly within its function as the
trier of the facts." Spears v. A. T. & Santa Fe R.R., 255 F.2d 780, 783 (C.A. 7th, 1958).

45 It should be noted that Judge Schnackenberg's condemnation of the Kimbrough
rule was dicta. The evidentiary issue was resolved on the ground that both parties, in
adducing hypothetical medical testimony, used the same question.
46

Een v. Consol. Freightways, 120 F. Supp. 289 (D. N.D., 1954).

47

7

Vigmore on Evidence, S 1929 (3rd ed., 1940).
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opinions are just that-opinion and not fact. The jury would then
weigh the expert opinions and the basis upon which they are founded
along with all the other evidence in the case. This procedure would
most adequately satisfy the necessity of searching for the truth; will
not improperly or unreasonably invade the province of the jury; will
not decide the ultimate fact; and will, most certainly, be an aid to
the trial bar in doing away with much confusion and uncertainty. The
hesitancy of the court to allow speculative testimony would be dispelled by the simple expedient of having the opinion supported by
the expert's reasons for arriving at his opinion. It seems logical to
conclude that requiring reasons to support an opinion would tend, at
least partially, to dispell the fear of biased or doubtful testimony and
place the medical witness on the same impartial level as other scientific
expert witnesses.
Wigmore, in criticizing the Kimbrough rule, states:
This is only one of the many instances in which the subtle mental twistings
produced by the Opinion rule have reduced this part of the law to a congeries
of non-sense which is comparable to the48incantations of medieval sorcerers and
sublies the name of Reason in our law.

Reason can be restored very simply by laying the Kimbrougb rule

to rest.
48 Ibid., at

S 1976.

